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The Nyaya Dualist Tradition: A Comparative Analysis 
 
 
 
Anirudh Seth 
 
 
 
A. Introduction: 
Indian philosophy is a rich, vast, though relatively neglected area of inquiry for 
the great majority of contemporary philosophers of mind. In particular, most of the 
contemporary work done in the philosophy of mind focuses primarily on the Western 
philosophical tradition, and more specifically, the focus tends to be on problems in the 
philosophy of mind that have arisen since the time of Descartes. Given this discrepancy, 
this paper will attempt to provide an expository analysis of ancient Indian thought, in the 
context of contemporary problems of mind. More specifically, this paper will focus on 
one specific school in Indian philosophy of mind, namely Nyaya dualism. In this paper, I 
hope to i. briefly explain Nyaya dualist ontology and identify the implications involved in 
accepting this view, ii. provide a comparison of Nyaya dualism to Cartesian dualism, and 
iii. provide an analysis of Nyaya dualism vis-à-vis some contemporary non-dualist 
theories of mind, in an attempt to gauge the viability of Nyaya Dualism as a theory of 
mind. 
 
B. Understanding Nyaya Dualism: 
 Before I begin explaining the fundamentals of Nyaya dualism, I will briefly 
identify the context and history of this school in Indian Philosophy and will attempt to 
describe how this paper approaches and interprets Nyaya thinking. The Nyaya school is 
one of seven major schools1 in the Indian philosophical tradition, and is perhaps the one 
of the oldest2. The first philosophers in this school date back to the sixth century BC, 
starting with thinkers like Gotama and Vatsyayana3.  
This paper will deal with Nyaya dualism as interpreted by Kisor Chakrabarti, Jean B. 
Williams Professor at Ferrum College. Chakrabarti has written a number of succinct and 
readily accessible accounts of Nyaya thought, and his account of Nyaya dualism is 
particularly interesting. It is important to note at the outset that Chakrabarti calls his 
interpretation of Nyaya dualism, Nyaya-Vaisesika dualism, to acknowledge that parts of 
his version and interpretation draw on thinking from another school in Indian thought, 
namely the Vaisesika school. In addition, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy will 
be used as a cross-reference to clarify certain aspects of Chakrabarti’s interpretation. 
                                                 
1 Chakrabarti cites seven schools, namely, Nyaya, Vaisesika, the Syncretic school, Baudda, Smakhya, 
Carvaka, and Advaita. 
2 Chakrabarti, Kisor. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. Pp. 17 
3 Chakrabarti, Kisor. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. Pp. 17 
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Further, it is important to note that translating Nyaya from Sanskrit to English can be 
problematic in the sense that much of the translated English terminology does not 
necessarily correspond directly to the intended meaning in Sanskrit. For example, the 
term guna or ‘qualities’ (as translated) has a very specific and distinct interpretation in 
Nyaya thought relative to what we would conventionally call qualities (i.e. simply 
properties of objects such as colors, sounds, feels etc). Having established these basic 
facts, we can now proceed to our analysis of Nyaya dualism. 
 
I. The fundamental principles of Nyaya Dualist Ontology: 
Nyaya dualists believe that a living body is a necessary condition for the origin of 
conscious states4. According to the conventional view, Nyaya dualists hold that there are 
seven essential ‘reals’ in the world; i. substance (dravya), ii. qualities (guna), iii. action 
(karma), iv. universal (samanya), v. ultimate individuater (visesa), vi. inherence 
(samavaya), and vii. negative entities (abhava). 5
 
1. Substances: 
A substance is the substratum of qualities and actions in the sense that it is 
something in which there cannot be any absolute absence of the latter. Thus, no substance 
can exist in absentia of any qualities or actions. Further, a substance is “…a continuant 
and different from its qualities and action: it may remain the same, even when its 
qualities or actions change” (Chakrabarti  17). A mango, for example, may remain the 
same even when its color changes, or when it falls off a tree (a kind of action). Further, 
all substances exist in space (space will be discussed further in this section). Substances 
in Nyaya have a separate and distinct existence in a way that their inherent properties do 
not. Properties merely inhere in a substance, and do not have an existence independent of 
the substances in which they inhere. 
In Nyaya dualism, qualities and actions are usually perceptible, as is the substance 
which underlies them. However, it may be the case that the qualities and actions are 
perceptible, but the underlying substance imperceptible (for example, the self may be an 
imperceptible substance, though it possesses perceptible qualities like cognition or 
desire.)6 Thus, a substance can be both perceptible and imperceptible in Nyaya thought, 
though the qualities and actions emerging from that substance are always perceptible. 
 
2. Perception: 
Perception in Nyaya thought is divided into two types. The first is external 
perception and perceptibility (i.e. the ability of others to perceive certain things in the real 
world). The other is internal perception, or the ability of the self to perceive the qualities, 
actions, etc that characterize it. 
External perception is sub-divided into two categories in Nyaya thought: 
savikalpa (constructed) and nirviklpa pratyaksa (non-constructed) perceptions. For 
                                                 
4 Ibid, 2-3. 
5 Franco, E. and Karin, P. (1998). Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy Online. N.B.: Chakrabarti translates guna as qualia rather than as qualities, though given the 
history of the term in the philosophy of mind, I used the definition provided by Prof. Laine and the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6 Ibid, 2 
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example, simply seeing a cow will be a non-constructed perception, but perceiving a cow 
as being a cow is constructed. 
 
3. Physical/spiritual Substances, the Self and the inner sense: 
 “The Nyaya admits five kinds of physical substances, namely earth, water, fire 
and air, and akasa (the substratum of sound)” (Chakrabarti 17). Most physical substances 
(though not all) have externally perceivable qualities and actions, according to Nyaya 
thought. This feature of the physical is more of an empirical observation than an a priori 
truth in Nyaya (thus, we tend to observe regularly that physical substances posses some 
kind of qualities and/or action). Nyaya thought leaves open the possibility of physical 
substances without externally perceivable qualities or actions. Matter (i.e. physical 
substances) in the Nyaya view, is simply that without the support of which externally 
perceptible qualities and actions could not exist. Matter is therefore the causal substratum 
of externally perceptible qualities.  
The self is a kind of spiritual substance, radically different from any of the other 
substances. The self is considered the substratum of consciousness. Further, “…the self is 
considered to be both beginningless and endless…”1 in the Nyaya view. The self, 
however, does not have externally perceptible qualities or actions. As a substance, the 
self must have some qualities or actions, though these are only internally perceivable.  
Nyaya thinkers also hold that there are three additional substances aside from the 
self, and the five physical substances mentioned above. The first two of these are space 
(dik) and time, both of which are infinite and continuous. The third is the inner sense 
(manas). “The inner sense is imperceptible but is inferred to account for the direct 
awareness of internal states like pleasure. It is also inferred to account for the fact that 
there are occasions when although two or more perceptions could arise at the same time, 
only one does” (Chakrabarti 17). Thus, the inner sense is a regulator (like the eye) 
ensuring that perceptions (or light waves), come to us in an organized manner. Space, 
time and the inner sense are neither physical substances (since they lack externally 
perceptible qualities) nor are they spiritual substances (like the self), since they lack 
consciousness. 
 
4. Qualities and Actions: 
Qualities are features of a substance that do not generate motion and are particular 
to the substances to which they belong (e.g. color, smell, etc.) Qualities in the Nyaya 
view are thought to be exclusively tied to the substances that they characterize. Thus, 
“…the particular red color of a particular mango is causally dependant on and inheres in 
that mango and cannot belong to anything else” (Chakrabarti 17). However, qualities do 
instantiate universals. “For example, the particular red color of a particular mango is an 
instance of the universal redness that is the common property of all particular red colors.” 
(Chakrabarti 17). The universal redness is ontologically distinct from the particular red 
colors, which are distinct from the substances. Thus, qualities are quality particulars and 
not quality universals. 
Actions are features of a substance that primarily generate motion (resulting in 
conjunction with or disjunction from other substances). They too, as qualities, are 
                                                 
1 Ibid, 2 
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particular to the substance for the same reason (i.e. actions are causally dependant on and 
inhere in the substance.)2
 
5. Universals vs. Particulars: 
As mentioned earlier, particulars in Nyaya thought are specific to each and every 
incidence of that particular. All substances, actions, and qualities are considered to be 
particulars. However, they all possess recurrent properties that are common to other 
substances, qualities and actions. For example, the color green: both the leaf of an oak 
tree and the wild grass of the African savannah are green. Nyaya thought grants that the 
green of the oak leaf is particular to that specific leaf, as is the green of the grass to the 
savannah. However, each and every oak leaf and each and every strand of grass in the 
savannah possess the property of greenness. The recurrent property of greenness is the 
universal (i.e. the fact that we acknowledge that all these plants are green is the universal 
greenness.) Universals are not merely categories or names. “They are objective, 
independent of the particulars that share them and are, in fact, changeless and eternal” 
(Chakrabarti 17). Universals are perceptible in particulars (for example, cowness is 
perceptible in all individual cows). 
 
6. Ultimate Individuators: 
 There are certain occasions when two or more particulars “…cannot be found to 
be different in any recognizable way although they are distinct on substantial grounds. 
For example, envisage two atoms that are indiscernible in every way, though are know to 
be different by virtue of the fact that they are two distinct objects in the real world.3 In 
such cases, Nyaya thought invokes the concept of ultimate individuators, which are 
considered a last remaining feature to distinguish two particulars. This is to ensure that 
the identity of indiscernables does not accidentally group two particulars together as one 
in Nyaya thought (e.g. if all the properties/particulars that characterize atom A are the 
same as those that categorize atom B, the identity of indiscernables would conclude that 
A and B are the same atom; however, the fact that these two atoms are distinct can be 
inferred if they really are observably distinct.) Thus, the fact that I have observed two 
atoms (even though I cannot distinguish any distinct property of A that B lacks, or vice-
versa) is the ultimate individuator that allows me to conclude that there are indeed two 
distinct atoms. 
 
 7. Inherence: 
Recall the aforementioned discussion of universals and particulars. In Nyaya 
thought, the universal and the particular are causally inter-dependant. For example, “…an 
individual cow cannot but be a cow a long as it exists and, in the Nyaya jargon, cowness 
is present in it from the moment of its birth till the moment of its death” (Chakrabarti 18). 
This interdependency is called samavaya, or inherence. Inherence is also the relation 
between qualities/action and substances (i.e. the qualities and action characterizing a 
substance cannot exist without the substance and vice-versa.) Thus, inherence is the 
natural, “…intimate relation between two relata [where] at least one of which cannot 
exist without the other” (Chakrabarti 18). 
                                                 
2 Ibid, 4 
3 Ibid, 4 
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8. Negative Entities: 
True negative judgments are not affirmations in Nyaya thought, but rather have 
“objective counterparts” (Chakrabarti 19) called negative entities. For example, the 
statement “there is no book on the table”, implies the absence of a book on a table. 
Negative entities always have a locus (the table, in the example above) and a negatum (a 
book). 
 
9. More on Space (Extension), time and the ‘physical’: 
In the Nyaya view, the concept of the physical is not as cut and dry as it is in the 
conventional view. Physical objects are in the realm of space and time (most physical 
objects occupy a certain space and time). However, all physical objects do not occupy 
space and time in the same way. For example, bricks, stones, cats, dogs, etc all occupy a 
certain space at any given time. The presence of a brick in a particular space at a 
particular time precludes the possibility of any other physical object being in the same 
space at the same time. However, in Nyaya thought, there are physical substances that 
can be in space, but not prevent other substances from being in the same space. For 
example, akasa, the substratum of sound, is physical and in space, though it does not 
occupy any limited region of space. This is because it is extended4, though not limited to 
any one locus in space. 
Therefore, Nyaya draws a distinction between two different senses of being in 
space. The first is that of occupying a particular region in space, and preventing other 
measurable physical substances from being in that space (the brick, for example.) The 
second is that of being extended and being in contact with a substance. “Something in 
contact with a measurable (or immeasurable) substance need not prevent other 
measurable (or immeasurable) substances from being in contact with that same thing” 
(Chakrabarti 20). Nyaya thought thus implies that all physical substances are in space, in 
either the first or second sense.  
All extended substances are not, however, physical in Nyaya thought. Thus, being 
physical necessarily implies being extended, though not the other way around. “Being 
extended in the sense of being in contact with another substance is true of all substances, 
physical or non-physical, including the self.” (Chakrabarti 21) So the self turns out to be 
an extended, spiritual substance in the Nyaya view. 
 
10. Internal States
Internal states in Nyaya thought are the internally perceptible qualities and actions 
of the self (the only spiritual substance in Nyaya thought). These include pleasure, pain, 
cognition etc. “Internal states arise within the limits of the body, but they do not belong to 
the body. They belong only to the self” (Chakrabarti 21). In many ways, internal states 
are like the mental states of Cartesian dualism, with the notable difference being that 
Nyaya thought establishes that internal states must be in space (i.e. extended). In 
addition, it is important to note that Nyaya is a theistic school, treating God as a 
distinctive spiritual substance. 
The above sections are designed to be an introductory guide to Nyaya ontology, 
since a more detailed discussion of this ontology is not within the scope of this paper. 
                                                 
4 N.B. Extension is the property of ‘being in space’ in Nyaya terminology. 
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However, it is important to keep in mind the following few implications drawn from the 
description above. The self is a kind of substance different from internal states such as 
cognition, desire, pleasure or pain (all of which are qualities that belong to the self, 
though not to any physical substances.) Thus, Nyaya is committed to both a substance 
dualism (since the self is a substance distinct from other substances) and a qualities 
dualism (there are qualities of the self that are not reducible to qualities of any other 
substance). 
Having established a basic framework of Nyaya ontology, we can proceed to our 
comparative analysis of Nyaya to Cartesian dualism. 
 
C. Nyaya dualism vs. Cartesian Dualism: Overcoming the problem of explaining 
mental to physical interaction 
The key feature differentiating Nyaya dualism from the Cartesian view is that the 
self is a spiritual (i.e. non-physical) substance in space, a contradiction in the Cartesian 
view. Recall that Cartesian dualism holds that there are two substances: mind and matter. 
Mind is non-physical and not in space (i.e. unextended) and matter is physical and 
extended. However, Nyaya holds that ‘the self’ (synonymous with the mind in Cartesian 
thought) is extended, but not physical. A simple matrix illustrating this key difference is 
shown below: 
 
The Cartesian View: 
 
 Extended (in space) Unextended (not in space) 
 
Physical 
Matter(physical 
substances) 
 
Non-
physical 
 Mind (the self) 
 
The Nyaya View:  
 
 Extended (in space) Unextended (not in space) 
 
Physical 
Matter  
Non-
physical 
Mind (the self) 
and the Inner sense 
 
 
 
Thus, the Nyaya can escape the Cartesian problem of having to establish a causal 
relation between the mind and matter, since they are both part of a causal substratum 
(namely, space). Essentially, the distinction rests in the fact that Cartesian dualists believe 
that the non-physical is also non-spatial, a category mistake according to Nyaya thought. 
This result is particularly revealing of an underlying problem with not only Cartesian 
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dualists, but several western theories of mind, namely, the assumption that being in space 
necessitates physicality. Thus, either something is physical and in space, or non-physical 
and not in space. The Nyaya view space more like a 
dimension in which everything is dispersed, rather 
than limiting space to that of the externally 
observable material universe (as Cartesians, and 
indeed many western theories of mind do.) Thus, 
space is considered to be like a plane in which 
everything operates, containing both physical and 
non-physical things (see the diagram below). That 
which is not in space, is not in existence. However, 
being material (i.e. physical) is not a prerequisite for 
existence in space. 
Nyaya dualists see space as a two dimensional 
plane, consisting of the physical and the non-physical 
(ironic, since we can use a Cartesian plane to illustrate their view of space). 
Physical 
 
SPACE 
A related problem plaguing Cartesian dualism is averted with the Nyaya view, 
namely, that the Cartesian problem of the spaceless mental states. Mental states in the 
Cartesian view have temporal, but not special features. Therefore, my thoughts, ideas, 
feelings, consciousness, etc (i.e. all mental states, or the products of my mind) are 
considered to exist for a certain period of time, but still lack spatial characteristics. Thus, 
my mental state of pain lacks any spatial characteristics (my pain lasts for some period of 
time, but is not in space).  
The Nyaya view of mental states is that they are internally perceptible qualities of 
the self, all of which are non-physical, but in space. The causal interaction between the 
mental (internal) states and the physical world is through the medium of space (where the 
mental and physical overlap). It is just that these states occur within the confines of my 
body (a necessary container for the self.) However, the fact that they occur, the fact that I 
can perceive them and the fact that they have causal powers over the material world can 
all be explained by the fact that t
physical), and not in some other 
mental dimension (as the 
Cartesians argue). The causal 
relationship between the two 
would be like a mathematical 
equation relating x and y. 
Further, this view allows the 
causal relation to work in 
multiple ways: thus, mental 
events can cause physical events 
and vice-versa. Additionally, 
single/multiple physical events 
can lead to multiple/single 
mental events. 
For exam
hey are indeed in space (a same space shared by the 
ple, imagine that 
I put my hand on a hot stove Physical
Non-Physical 
1. Put hand 
on stove 
2.Pain
Step 1: Physical to Non-Physical
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(admitt
 explain the intricate relationship between the 
ally perceivable quaila of the self, could only be felt 
by me (
ught relative to Cartesian 
dualism
 
D. Nyaya Dualism vs. Other Theories of Mind: 
1. Nyaya vs. Materialism:
edly a bad idea). In the Nyaya view, this physical event would lead to the non-
physical event of pain (an internal state of the self). The causal relationship would be 
explained through a relationship in space (see Step 1 below).  
The causal points on the graph are what
mental (non-physical) and physical. 
My pain, since it is an intern
i.e. my self). Further still, my pain may cause other physical events to occur, such 
as me screaming out, and removing my hand (Step 2 above).  
Having explained the key differences in Nyaya tho
, let us now proceed to examine how Nyaya compares with some other theories of 
mind. 
 
 
Physical
Non-Physical 
1. Put 
hand 
on 
stove 
2.Brain 
state of 
Pain 
 
have a
us, the materialist 
Materialist Conception: Nyaya framework 
3.Brain state 
of screaming 
and removing 
hand 
4.Actual 
screaming 
and removing 
hand 
The Materialist would 
 number of objections to 
Nyaya thought. First, the 
materialist would argue that the 
Nyaya conception of space as 
constituent not only of physical 
but non-physical events is 
flawed. Materialists reject the 
entire notion of there being a 
non-physical self (i.e. a mind 
outside the realm of the 
physical), and so the entire non-
physical dimension Nyaya 
dualism establishes would be 
rejected.  
 Th
would argue that Nyaya dualists 
have overcomplicated and 
confused a rather simple, purely 
physical phenomenon (namely 
that the Nyaya non-physical 
states and events are simply a 
series of neural firings in the 
brain). Thus, even if the 
materialist accepts the 
framework from which Nyaya 
thinkers establish a relation 
between non-physical and 
physical (namely the plane of 
space), materialists would view 
Physical
Non-Physical 
3. Scream
2.Pain
Step 2: Non- Physical to Physical 
Hand 
4. Remove 
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the aforementioned scenario as 
follows. My hand on the stove 
causes neural firings in my brain, 
which is the brain state of pain. 
This brain state then causes 
another set of associated neural 
firings (the brain state of me 
screaming and removing my 
hand from the stove.)  
 To this, Nyaya thinkers 
r hand on the stove.) The Nyaya framework helps 
2. Nyaya vs. Searle:
would simply respond by saying 
that materialists cannot explain 
how non-physical events, such as 
pain, come about and differ 
amongst different people (i.e. my 
pain, and my reaction to pain 
may be, and most likely is, 
different to the pain someone 
else would feel from putting thei
explain why humans feel and perceive things differently (i.e. different selves, e.g. person 
A and person B, have a different set of causal points relating their specific physical event 
to their specific mental state.) Additionally, Nyaya dualists may argue that materialists 
cannot explain how brain states come about without being invoked by some event in the 
real world, and therefore, the materialists have ignored the true nature of the mind by 
including non-physical phenomenon in the physical realm.  Further, materialists have 
trouble explaining phenomenon such as consciousness, which are internally perceptible 
qualities of the self according to Nyaya. 
 
Physical
Non-Physical 
1. Put 
hand 
on 
stove 
2 A’s Pain
3. A Screams 
and removes 
hand 
Consciousness 
The Self 
2 B’s Pain
3. B’s 
Reaction 
(distinct from 
A’s) 
Nyaya framework: Consciousness and 
Two Person -case 
 
ory of biological naturalism to explain the mind. Thus, the 
mind m
ot 
comple
Searle proposes a the
ust be understood in the context of the circumstances that surround it, and so the 
mental-physical divide most theories of mind try to make is not a valid one. Additionally, 
Searle rejects several problems of the philosophy of mind (since he argues that they arise 
as a result of flawed assumptions and category mistakes made by mind theorists since 
Descartes.) Therefore, Searle would argue that the Nyaya view (like Cartesian dualism) 
also faces the problem of categorizing events as ‘mental’ and ‘physical’, even though the 
causal relationship between the two does not suffer from the problems associated with 
Cartesian dualism. I do not think that Searle would reject Nyaya merely on the basis of 
this fact, but rather note that the Nyaya theory of mind is not any better at addressing the 
problems of the philosophy of mind than any other cognitive theory presented thus far. 
Nyaya dualists would respond by arguing that Searle’s conception of mind is n
te enough to explain the intricate nature of the relationship between the mind and 
the material world. In other words, Nyaya dualists, as many contemporary theories of 
mind, would claim that Searle’s biological naturalism contains an explanatory gap, and 
does not capture the fullness of the self. It is not that they would reject Searle as 
incapable of acknowledging consciousness, beliefs, etc (since he is a mental realist), but 
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rather that biological naturalism fails to acknowledge the true nature of self, and the other 
non-physical substances. 
In my view, although Nyaya dualists make a distinction that Searle would 
probab
. Conclusion: 
alism is clearly a unique and comprehensive way of addressing the 
at the non-physical realm exists (a 
stating objection to Nyaya dualism is that their 
mew
It is interesting to note that the problem of mental causation does not specifically 
ly disagree with, the view of biological naturalism and Nyaya’s causal plane of 
space are very similar, in that both take into account the complexity of the context 
surrounding the mind. In biological naturalism, we are asked to look at the spectrum of 
circumstances that form the context of the mind in order to understand it. In the Nyaya 
framework, the spectrum of different possible causal interactions is presented in the plane 
of space, some of which are chosen at one time, and some at another. The underlying idea 
in both is that there are a variety of different and complex situations that affect our 
understanding of mind.  
 
E
 Nyaya du
problems of the mind. However, though it may seem like the approach Nyaya dualists 
take in order to explain non-physical to physical interaction avoids many of the problems 
associated with traditional dualism, I find that it is still unable to adequately escape the 
mind-body problem, as well as other key objections. 
 The first such objection is the assumption th
typical attack against substance dualism). Although I may believe it to exist, there is no 
observable, objective evidence to establish its presence and the significance of the non-
physical thus drops out of the picture (ironically, Nyaya dualists would argue that the 
very fact that we cannot objectively observe the non-physical is what makes the non-
physical, non-physical.) Thus, our lack of being able to understand other ‘selves’ can 
only be explained by the non-physical nature of the self (for were it physical, everyone 
could clearly observe and understand it’s nature, and the entire purpose for any inquiry 
into the mind would be gone.) The reason we have these unresolved problems of mind 
(i.e. the reason we have so many pressing questions about the nature of mind) is because 
the mind is a non-physical entity. 
 Another potentially deva
fra ork suffers from a logical contradiction. The non-physical is considered to be that 
which is not physical (i.e. the negation of physical). However, by the laws of logic, a 
proposition and its negation are mutually exclusive (i.e. the causal plane of space where 
the physical and non-physical supposedly interact is logically empty). Thus, because of 
this logical contradiction, Nyaya dualism collapses. The Nyaya dualist would probably 
respond to this by stating that this interpretation misunderstands the complex nature of 
the causal substratum of space. It is not that space is some construct of the physical and 
the non-physical (i.e. space is not strictly defined to be the overlap between the physical 
and non-physical), but rather a common dimension in which they interact and exist. Thus, 
it is not contradictory to say that the physical and non-physical interact in the plane of 
space. 
 
arise as a problem within the Nyaya dualist tradition, as compared with the questions 
Descartes raised about the mind-body relationship in the Western philosophical tradition. 
This is particularly interesting, given that both traditions faced the same problem. Part of 
the reason for this discrepancy may lie in problems due to translation (since the terms 
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‘mind’ and atman or ‘the Self’ do not necessarily have the same connotation). However, 
another possible reason for this inconsistency may rest in the fact that personal identity 
was not in question for Nyaya thinkers (it is clear from the outset who I am: I am my 
atman or my Self. My body is just a shell for the self.) However, Descartes was 
ultimately trying to identify who he was (i.e. he was trying to establish whether his mind 
could exist independently of his body, and if so, what it is that makes his body and mind 
interact.) Thus, since personal identity was not in question for Nyaya thinkers, the 
problem of mental causation was not really a problem at all. 
 In this paper, I have attempted to explain Nyaya dualism in the context of some of 
e maj
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